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Abstract The thesis of the paper holds that some future developments of argu-
mentation theory may be inspired by the rich logico-methodological legacy of the
Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS), the Polish research movement that was most active
from 1895 to 1939. As a selection of ideas of the LWS which exploit both formal
and pragmatic aspects of the force of argument, we present: Ajdukiewicz’s account
of reasoning and inference, Bochen´ski’s analyses of superstitions or dogmas, and
Frydman’s constructive approach to legal interpretation. This paper does not aim at
exhaustive elaboration of any of these topics or their usefulness in current discus-
sions within argumentation theory. Rather, we intend to indicate chosen directions
of a potentially fruitful research program for the emerging Polish School of
Argumentation which would consist in application of methods and conceptions
elaborated by the LWS to selected open problems of contemporary research on
argumentation.
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The flourishing of contemporary argumentation theory may be illustrated with a
variety of research ideas, approaches and methods which are capable of
encompassing many aspects of rich phenomenon of argumentation. Thanks to
applicability of various traditions in philosophy, logic, cognitive science, computer
science, and legal theory, intensive attempts have been made towards dealing with a
number of open problems which still need to be explored and discussed in a
systematic way.
The thesis of this paper holds that the logico-methodological tradition of the
Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS) may constitute a source of inspiration for some
current problems in contemporary argumentation theory. The rise and development
of the LWS—the philosophical movement (1895–1939) established by Kazimierz
Twardowski in Lwo´w (Lvov) (see Wolen´ski 1989, Ch. 1; Lapointe et al. 2009;
Jadacki 2009) is associated with ‘The Golden Age of Science and Letters’ in Poland
(Simons 2002, 2014). The heritage of the LWS is famous for the developments of
mathematical logic, thanks to such thinkers as Łukasiewicz, Les´niewski, Tarski,
Sobocin´ski, Mostowski, Lejewski, Jas´kowski1 and many others (see, e.g. Kneale
and Kneale 1962; Wolen´ski 1995). Apart from outstanding achievements in formal
logic, the rich legacy of the LWS covers a great variety of ideas in epistemology,
ontology, philosophy of language, philosophy of argument, methodology of science,
legal theory, ethics and aesthetics. Amongst the key research strands of the LWS
(see, e.g. Wolen´ski 1985; Jadacki 2009) there are: the general attitude to consider
specific problems rather than to build philosophical syntheses; the claim that the
methods of language analysis are indispensable in solving philosophical problems;
the significance of the association between philosophy and logic, and between
philosophy and science (see also Smith 2006, p. 22).
Although an important strand in the contemporary study of argumentation is to
build bridges between distinct research perspectives and traditions (see e.g. van
Eemeren 1995; van Eemeren et al. 2014), the legacy of the LWS is almost absent in
contemporary study of argumentation. One possible explanation of this fact would
be that probably the LWS has not very much to say about argument analysis,
evaluation and presentation. However, the rich repertoire of tools applicable in the
study of language and reasoning elaborated in the school allows to cast some doubts
on this claim. Another possible explanation of the lack of the LWS on the map of
research traditions applied in the study of argumentation is the fact that the
international recognition of the heritage of the school focuses almost entirely on the
development of formal logic. Although analytic philosophers discuss in details the
formal-logical heritage of the LWS (see, e.g. Jadacki 2009; Smith 2006; Wolen´ski
1989), some other achievements of the school are not sufficiently represented in the
world’s philosophy. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Wolen´ski 2010b), apart from the achievements in mathematical logic, the LWS
is scarcely known outside Poland as the broader philosophical enterprise:
1 For a note on Jas´kowski’s ‘discussive logic’ (Jas´kowski 1948) as a remarkable attempt at combining
formal and informal accounts of everyday arguments and disagreements see (Griffin 2013).
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As far as the matter concerns international importance, one thing is clear. The
logical achievements of the LWS became the most famous. Doubtless, the
Warsaw school of logic contributed very much to the development of logic in
the 20th century. Other contributions are known but rather marginally. This is
partially due to the fact that most philosophical writings of the LWS appeared
in Polish. However, this factor does not explain everything. Many writings of
the LWS were originally published in English, French or German. However,
their influence was very moderate, considerably lesser than that of similar
writings of philosophers from the leading countries (Wolen´ski 2010b).
We may here observe a gap between the rich repertoire of research devices of the
study of language and reasoning in the LWS and the lack of this tradition in
contemporary philosophy of argument. This observation is a point of departure for
raising the question: which of contemporary open problems in argumentation theory
may be attacked by employing the legacy of the LWS?
In what follows we will answer this question by showing how some ideas of the
LWS may constitute a source of inspiration for solving some selected open
problems in argumentation theory. The idea of logical culture employed in the LWS
research (Sect. 2.1) constitutes a general framework for discussion of more concrete
ideas, such as Ajdukiewicz’s account of inference—as it may be employed in
argument analysis and evaluation (Sect. 2.2), Bochen´ski’s theory of superstitions or
dogmas—as it may enrich the state of the art in the study of fallacies and
argumentation schemes (Sect. 3), and Frydman’s constructive theory of legal
interpretation—as it is potentially fruitful for development of contemporary formal
models of legal reasoning (Sect. 4). Our discussion of these four areas will
demonstrate clear affinities between the ideas of the LWS and the concepts and
methods of contemporary argumentation theory. Our hope is that making these
affinities plain will make the case that the ideas of the LWS merit further
investigation by contemporary argumentation theorists.
2 Logical Culture and Pragmatic Logic
In this section we will show how the ideal of logical culture present in the tradition
of the LWS is linked to argumentation theory (Sect. 2.1.) and how some key
elements of this ideal may be inspiring for the study of reasoning in argumentation
theory (Sect. 2.2.). Although the concept of logical culture is common for various
areas of interest of the LWS, the study of reasoning is the representative area in
which it manifests itself most clearly (Wolen´ski 2010b). Hence, it seems quite
natural to discuss it in the context of the study of reasoning.
2.1 The Ideal of Logical Culture
The term ‘logical culture’ was employed by the major representatives of the LWS to
denote the general ideal which should be realized in order to move one’s thinking
and language use in a more logical direction. Logical culture joins two components:
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(1) advances in the logical studies are claimed to be applicable in (2) teaching skills
of expresing our thoughts with precise language and of proper thinking
(Ajdukiewicz 1974, pp. 2–3). A clear demonstration of this attitude was given by
Tarski in his Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences:
½. . . by perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, [logic] makes man
more critical — and thus makes less likely their being misled by all the
pseudo-reasonings to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly
exposed today (Tarski 1995, p. xi).
The idea of applying logic to form a person who ‘‘possesses logical knowledge and
competence in logical thinking and expressing one’s thoughts’’ (Cze _zowski 2000, p.
68) refers not only to knowlegde and skills of formal logic, but also to the ability of
employing semiotics and methodology of science in analysing and evaluating
language use and reasoning (Koszowy 2010).2 Some representatives of the LWS
(e.g. Ajdukiewicz 1974) hold that the application of the sets of rules elaborated by
these disciplines in analysing and evaluating language use and reasoning is a form
of manifesting one’s rationality, what is close to Johnson’s idea that ‘‘the practice of
argumentation is best understood as an exercise in manifest rationality’’ (Johnson
2000, p. 10).3
The similarity between logical education in Poland and argumentation theory
may be explained by exposing the resemblance between LWS and the pragma-
dialectical ideal of critical discussion. The main affinity lies in the very rationale for
building the theory of argument. For example, van Eemeren (2012) explains the
motivation for the theory developed in (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984) by
claiming that the pragma-dialectical approach ‘‘should systematically combine a
commitment to empirically adequate description with a critical normative stance’’
(van Eemeren 2012, p. 440). For example, Ajdukiewicz’s account of pragmatic
methodology (Ajdukiewicz 1974) also combines these pragmatic and normative
insights:
The standards of correctness of research procedures, as formulated in
methodology, are not dictated by it to researchers in advance. Such standards
are derived from practical activities of competent researchers, who approve of
some procedures in research, they disapprove of others (Ajdukiewicz 1974, p.
187 [emphases added]).
Here we may observe the presence of the similar components of the research
program which are noted by van Eemeren. For Ajdukiewicz clearly begins with the
practice of researchers (in van Eemeren’s terms: ‘empirically adequate description’
of the practice of researchers), which is the point of reference to formulate
methodological standards (rules, norms), which constitute ‘a normative stance’.
2 An interesting research task would be to consider to what extent the ideal of logical culture is today
realized within current educational programs in Poland which—amongst other aims—stress the need of
developing linguistic and reasoning abilities of students (see e.g. Federowicz and Sitek 2011, Eds.).
However, this task goes beyond the scope of this paper.
3 For the discussion of key affinities between the LWS and the Informal Logic Initiative see (Koszowy
2013).
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2.2 The LWS and the Inquiry into the Nature of Reasoning
In this section we will argue that some ideas constituting the pragmatic approach to
reasoning in the LWS anticipated discussions of one of the major open problems in
argumentation theory, i.e. what is the nature of common-sense reasoning in natural
language communication? (e.g. Pollock 1995; Prakken and Vreeswijk 2002;
Rahwan and Simari 2009, Eds.).
Since formal logic constituted the key interest of the LWS (Wolen´ski 1988), it is
not surprising that representatives of the LWS were referring mostly to deductive
criteria of validity of reasoning as the foundation for the ‘proper’ theory of
reasoning. For example, Łukasiewicz, by claiming that deductive methods are
exclusively useful in scientific research, completely lost interest in studying any
other kinds of reasoning except deductive ones (see Wolen´ski 1988, p. 29). It should
be noted that nowadays the use of rigorous formal methods to model also non-
deductive reasoning is a standard approach (Selinger 2014, this issue, and literature
quoted there).
A clear example of extending the formal tradition of the LWS in order to grasp
the broader class of commonsense reasoning, are Hitchcock’s (Hitchcock 2009)
analyses of Tarski’s account of logical consequence. Hitchcock proposes an
extension of Tarski’s condition for the adequacy of an account of what it is for a
sentence to follow from the sentences of a given class, in order to include some
extra-logical terms as if they were logical. According to Hitchcock, this extension
may be formulated as follows: ‘‘for some non-empty subset of the extra-logical
constants in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X, if uniform
substitution on these constants produces a new class of sentences K 0 and a new
sentence X0, then the sentence X0 must be true if all the sentences of the class K 0 are
true’’ (Hitchcock 2009, p. 143). This line of inquiry may be continued by showing
those attempts present in the LWS which are focused on broadening the scope of
formal-logical notions in order to grasp some common natural language commu-
nication phenomena. Hitchcock’s approach is fully justified by the fact that most of
the prominent representatives of the LWS, such as Tarski, employed definitions of
logical consequence as a theoretical foundation of the theory of reasoning. Thus,
Hitchcock’s analyses show that even those key representatives of the LWS who
were developing formal logic have worked in ways that argumentation theorists can
recognize and appreciate.
Another idea of the LWS which seems to be quite remarkable from the point of
view of argumentation theory is Ajdukiewicz’s approach to classify reasoning. In
his famous talk given at the 1st Conference of Logicians in 1952 in Warsaw (which
was later published in Polish in Studia Logica, vol. 2, 1955), Ajdukiewicz presented
his critique of clasifications of reasoning proposed by Łukasiewicz and Cze _zowski
(see Wolen´ski 1988, p. 44). One of Ajdukiewicz’s objections which may be crucial
for the study of argumentation is that they defined a number of methodological
terms (such as inference) in a way which departs from the their common use in
natural language. This inclination causes that, according to Ajdukiewicz, some
distinctions of reasoning (such as the distinction between the reason and the
consequence) are artificial (Ajdukiewicz 1955; see Wolen´ski 1988, p. 45).
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Ajdukiewicz’s inquiry into the nature of reasoning motivated some of his
students to continue his pragmatic insights. Amongst them there are: Kokoszyn´ska
(1957), who included in her classification of reasoning in order to include uncertain
inference, Da˛mbska (1962), who included reasoning by analogy in her classification
of reasoning, and Szaniawski (1962), who proposed the pragmatic justification of
uncertain inferences.
Although this pragmatic line of the study of reasoning contains quite promising
insights into the nature of common-sense reasoning, it did not have enough strong
impact on the development of methodology of science in Poland (Wolen´ski 1988, p.
29). Hence, we propose the following research hypothesis: the pragmatic line of
inquiry into the nature of reasoning started by Ajdukiewicz, although not well-
known outside Poland, may serve as a legitimate point of departure for inspirations
of the study of common-sense reasoning. Amongst possible candidates for most
useful ideas there is Ajdukiewicz’s account of consequence.
Ajdukiewicz (1974, p. 99) accepts the following general concept of consequence:
‘‘a statement B is a consequence of a statement A if and only if the conditional
sentence that has A as its antecedent and B as its consequent is true’’. This concept is
an extension of the concept of logical consequence and it bases on the sentential
schemata which are ‘always true’ in the sense that they are satisfied by all values of
the variables which occur in them. These schemata belong not only to logic, but also
to extra-logical theories.
This approach may be treated as one that anticipated contemporary
argumentation theory with regard to the project of reconciling formal and
informal approaches to argumentation. Ajdukiewicz claims that the postulate of
building an adequate model for non-deductive reasoning should lead to extending
the conditions for validity of reasoning. This conciliatory view fits quite
naturally to some approaches to argumentation theory, where, on the one hand,
‘‘standardized forms of argument that represent common species of arguments
encountered in everyday conversational argumentation need to have a precise,
partly formal structure’’ (Walton 2008, p. xiii), and, on the other hand, the extra-
formal accounts are necessary in the study of common-sense reasoning (e.g.
Walton et al. 2008). Hence, the discussed idea of treating formal and informal
approaches to reasoning as two complementary (and not competing) wings of
inquiry is in accord with some attempts at reconciling formal and informal logic
(e.g. Walton and Gordon 2013), as well as at linking together computational
models of argument with pragma-dialectical discussion rules (Visser et al. 2011).
An example of a similar pragmatic approach to inference is present in the work of
Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1962), who explores at least three ideas which
anticipated some crucial strands in argumentation theory. First, her ‘pragmatic
account of entailment’ relates validity of reasoning to the context in which the given
reasoning is performed: ‘‘the sequence of propositions p1; . . .; pn entails pragmat-
ically the proposition pk (given the theoretical context) if the implication
p1; . . .; pn ! pk has been justified within this context.’’ This idea is similar to
some attempts of extending the criteria of argument’s validity in order to grasp not
only deductive, but also uncertain common-sense reasoning (e.g. Hitchcock 2009).
Second, by discussing the role of replies to arguments, she proposes a sort of a
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dialogical account of arguments. This approach may be interpreted in terms of
argumentation theory as a formal dialogue account of replies to arguments. This
idea is in line with formal-dialectical approaches to argumentation (Hamblin 1970;
Barth and Krabbe 1982). Third, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa’s pragmatic account of
entailment employs the structural approach to fallacies. It is based on quite modern
idea that the recognition of the structure of argument allows to identify typical
logical fallacies. Hence, as early as in 1960s, i.e. in the times when the unprecise
‘fallacy approach’ to arguments (Hamblin 1970) was dominating in logic textbooks,
Łuszczewska-Romahnowa proposed the approach the assumptions of which are
close the argumentation scheme theory approach (Walton et al. 2008). These
similarities may be a point of departure for exploring some key affinities between
Łuszczewska-Romahnowa’s use of replies as tools for identifying fallacies and the
basic idea of the pragma-dialectical approach, where identifying fallacies as
violations of the rules for critical discussion makes the resolution of the difference
of opinion more difficult, or even obstructs it (see e.g. van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004, p. 162; Debowska 2010, pp. 105–106). Another possible line of
inquiry inspired by Łuszczewska-Romahnowa’s account could be to compare her
approach to replies as ways of criticizing arguments with the ‘‘technique of applying
the general guidelines of criticism for each type of argumentation scheme to each
individual case (Walton 2008, p. ix).
3 Fallacies and Argumentation Schemes
In this section we will argue that some ideas of the LWS are capable to enrich the
state of the art in the study of fallacies and argumentation schemes. Some basic
affinities between the LWS and argumentation theory with regard to the study of
fallacies (Sect. 3.1.) are the point of departure for the discussion concerning
possible applications of Bochen´ski’s account of One Hundred Superstitions
(Bochen´ski 1994) in recognizing new kinds of argumentation schemes for fallacious
arguments (Sect. 3.2.).
3.1 The Systematic Study of Fallacies as a Key Feature of Distinct Research
Perspectives
The systematic study of the fallacies in the LWS was associated with the ideal of
logical culture. Apart from the ‘positive’ goal of logical culture which is to acquire
knowledge and skills of logic, the ‘negative’ part of inquiry was to identify typical
‘logical’ fallacies in speech communication and reasoning. The common tendency
of the study of the fallacies in the LWS manifests itself in the optimistic claim that
the study of mishaps of language use and reasoning helps in developing knowledge
of cognitive and linguistic mechanisms of error (e.g. Kamin´ski 1962, pp. 5–6). The
study of fallacies from the point of view of the LWS is built upon the
methodological program which is close to descriptive approaches developed by
some logicians and argumentation theorists who pursue the analysis of particular
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fallacies without stressing the need to build a separate fallacy theory. Quite recently,
the problem of identifying fallacies is investigated by the Polish School of
Argumentation by employing both formal (Yaskorska et al. 2013; Kacprzak and
Yaskorska 2014, this issue) and pragmatic tools (Budzynska and Witek 2014, this
issue).
The very first goal of philosophical analysis undertaken in the LWS was to
formulate a given statement as clearly as possible in order to avoid an obscure
style in thinking and expressing thougts (see Twardowski 1999; Wolen´ski
2010b). This postulate may be labeled ‘the principle of clarity’ (Jadacki 2009).
We may here notice two affinities with the pragma-dialectical theory of
argumentation. First, the principle of clarity is in accord with the Commandment
10 for a reasonable discussants (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp.
187–196) (i.e. ‘the language use rule’), which holds that discussants may not use
any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they
may not deliberately misinterpret the other party’s formulations. This command-
ment is designed to ensure that misunderstandings arising from unclear, vague,
or equivocal formulations in the discourse are avoided (ibid., p. 196). Second,
the principle of clarity is similar to the usage declarative in pragma-dialectics:
discussants can always ask for clarification by performing a directive or provide
clarification themselves with a usage declarative (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
1987, p. 294).
The main similarity between the study of fallacies in the LWS and within the
informal logic and critical thinking movement in North America lies in conceiving
fallacies as pitfalls of non-critical thinking. Although the terms such as ‘critical
thinking’ or ‘critical thinker’ are not present in the writings of the representatives
and inheritors of the LWS, one may observe the general approach to identyfying
most typical fallacies as violations of the rules of correct thinking and language use.
This account is present in Kamin´ski’s taxonomy of logical fallacies (Kamin´ski
1962, pp. 29–39). Kamin´ski distinguishes four general types of logical fallacies,
namely epistemological fallacies, semiotic fallacies, fallacies of reasoning (‘logical
fallacies in a strict sense’), and methodological fallacies of employing rules
governing knowledge-gaining procedures. This systematization is based on
assumption that fallacies are in fact instances of violating norms of proper
cognition and language use.
3.2 Bochen´ski’s Study of Dogmas and Superstitions as a Link Between LWS
and Argumentation Theory
An exemplification of discussed tendencies in the study of the fallacies are
Bochen´ski’s analyses of One Hundred Superstitions (Bochen´ski 1994). The goal of
his account of superstitions (or dogmas) is to help people to recognize typical
mechanisms commonly employed in the social communication and cognition the
aim of which is to convince someone to accept false beliefs.
In what follows we will discuss three examples of argumentation schemes
for fallacious arguments which may be built upon Bochen´ski’s analyses of
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superstitions. One of the typical dogmas discussed by Bochen´ski concerns appeals
to authority (Bochen´ski 1994, pp. 24–26). The key part of Bochen´ski’s theory of
authority (Bochen´ski 1974, Ch. 4) is the distinction between ‘epistemic authority’
(i.e. the authority of a person who possesses knowledge in a given field) and
‘deontic authority’ (i.e. someone who is authorized to formulate directives). This
ambiguity of ‘authority’ is discussed by Walton (1997, Ch. 3) as the distinction
between cognitive (de facto) and administrative (de iure) authority (see also
Budzynska 2010). In what follows we propose the reconstruction of Bochen´ski’s
analyses of the superstitions concerning authority by identifying them as schemes
for fallacious arguments.
According to Bochen´ski, a typical superstition concerning authority relies on
claiming that every appeal to authority is against reason and so the proposition
uttered by the authority should not be accepted in the epistemological sense, i.e. it
should not be included into the the set of beliefs of the audience. This superstition
may be reconstructed as follows.
Scheme for fallacious argument: ‘authority is against reason’
The second case of a superstition concerning authority is the belief which is
based on confusing deontic authority with epistemic authority. It may be
reconstructed as follows.
Scheme for fallacious argument: ‘confusing epistemic and deontic authority’
From the fact that X is a deontic authority one implies that the assertive (which
belongs to the domain of the epistemic authority) is true. This case may be analysed
as a clear instance of equivocation: ‘authority’ means either deontic authority which
is authorized to formulate directives or epistemic authority which is authorized to
formulate assertives.
The similar task may be accomplished with regards to some other superstitions
listed by Bochen´ski. For instance, he discusses the common dogma related to the
views on the social role of artists (pp. 21–22). As Bochen´ski argues, from the very
fact that someone is an artist, one may fallaciously conclude that he or she is
competent to act as an expert in a given field or as someone who is authorized to
formulate moral judgments. On the basis of this point we may propose another
example of a scheme for fallacious argument. The scheme points to the mechanism
of extending the area of one’s expertise:
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Scheme for fallacious argument: ‘the extension of authority’
The next possible step towards developing argumentation scheme theory in a
direction inspired by Bochen´ski would be to broaden the list of critical questions for
the general ‘appeal to authority’ argumentation scheme (e.g. Walton 1997, pp.
101–102, 210). In fact, Bochen´ski’s analyses of superstitions implicitly point to the
critical questioning procedure. Following some of these hints, we may propose the
following critical questions:
• CQ1 By claiming that someone is an authority in the domain do we mean
‘deontic’ or ‘epistemic’ authority?—as this question would allow to identify the
fallacy of confusing two kinds of authority;
• CQ2 Does someone claimed to be an authority utter assertives or directives?—
since being epistemic authority does not entail being competent to formulate
directives (Bochen´ski 1974, p. 263), this critical question would point to the
fallacy of extrapolating authority from the set of assertives to the set of
directives;
• CQ3 Does someone claimed to be an authority in a given domain extend his or
her area of competence by addressing world view or religious issues?—since,
according to Bochen´ski (1974, p. 265), appeals to epistemic authority should not
concern world view or religious beliefs, this question may be employed in
identifying the fallacy of confusing expertise with world view;
• CQ4 Is someone in a position to be an authority for this concrete audience?—
since Bochen´ski conceives authority as a relation (‘‘X is an authority for Y in the
domain D’’), this critical question would allow to point to the fallacy of
appealing the authority which does not fit to the audience.
Hence, the promising line of inquiry would be to extract critical questions from
Bochen´ski’s works, next to systematize them, and finally to include them into the
sets of critical questions for various argumentation schemes.
This sample of the rich repertoire of intellectual fallacies analyzed by Bochen´ski
allows for making a safe conjecture that a further analysis of Bochen´ski’s examples
could constitute a fruitful inspiration for a systematic study of fallacies committed
in social and political discourses. On the basis of those examples the program of
employing the ‘theory of superstitions’ in the argument scheme theory may be
started.
4 The LWS and Legal Argumentation
This section presents the LWS as a source of inspiration for contemporary theory of
legal argumentation. In particular, it is shown that one of the recent topics in this
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theory, namely, legal constructivism, has been investigated by one of the LWS
representatives, Sawa Frydman. We argue that Frydman’s conception may be useful
for the development of a model of legal argumentation representing statutory
interpretation.
4.1 Legal Constructivism: Nowadays and in the LWS
In principle, the most important LWS scholars did not investigate the topic of
legal argumentation systematically. Although Kotarbin´ski (Kotarbin´ski 1961a, pp.
447–451, Kotarbin´ski 1966) devoted some attention to practical reasoning, his
work cannot be assessed as an important contribution to legal argumentation
theory. However, all important LWS representatives were deeply concerned
about logic understood broadly as theory of proper reasoning and this general
methodological attitude had great influence on the development of legal
scholarship in Poland in the 20th century. Twardowski and Łukasiewicz
recognized importance of logic in legal education and Kotarbin´ski authored a
handbook of logic for lawyers (Kotarbin´ski 1961b) which made his general
theory of reasoning (Kotarbin´ski 1961a, pp. 257–287) even more influential as
regards legal audience. The influence of contributions of LWS on Polish legal
theory and doctrine cannot be deeply analysed in this paper, although it is
worthwhile to mention the works of Ziembin´ski (2011), Wro´blewski (1992) and
Wolen´ski (1972, 1980, 2007) who were applying methods developed by the
LWS to the problems of legal reasoning.
Although mainstream LWS scholars were influential for the development of
Polish legal theory but have not dealt with legal argumentation systematically,
there is also a group of legal philosophers and theorists classified as members of
the LWS, such as Jo´zef Zajkowski or Sawa Frydman (Wolen´ski 1985, p. 25)
whose work is basically unknown to English-speaking academy4 and who dealt
with important issues that contemporary argumentation theorists would find
surprisingly current. The aim of this section is, therefore, to show the similarities
and inspirations of topics discussed in contemporary theory of legal argumen-
tation on the one hand and by one of less known LWS scholars, Frydman, on
the other hand.
One of the most important and current topics in this theory is whether legal
argumentation is constructive or reconstructive. For instance Hage in one of his
recent papers (Hage 2013) discusses, first, an intuitively appealing distinction
between easy and hard cases in law and a criterion for this distinction according to
which in easy cases legal argumentation performs an epistemic function5, and in
hard cases legal argumentation is constitutive or constructive6 (Hage 2013, p. 126).
4 Their work is not the topic of intensive investigations in Polish legal academy either, but cf. Płeszka
(2005, 2010), Mos´ (1987, 1991), Zielin´ski (2002).
5 Argumentation helps to reconstruct the process of reasoning representing application of a legal rule to a
state of affairs, but does not create any new elements in the world of law.
6 Argumentation itself determines (creates) legal outcomes of cases. For a discussion of a more specific
topic concerning procedures for construction of succesful analogous and e contrario arguments in the field
of law, cf. Araszkiewicz (2011).
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Hage contests the sharpness of the distinction by criticizing the abovementioned
criterion. He argues for a unified view according to which legal argumentation
should be seen as constructive both in easy and hard cases. Legal consequences do
not have any kind of ‘independent existence’, but they emerge as conclusions of
law-applying arguments (Hage 2013, pp. 142–143).
Hage’s contribution is a general legal-philosophical elaboration of a topic which
has been looked at from many angles in AI and Law community since the 1990s. In
1997, McCarty published a paper in which he criticized formerly developed models
of legal argument in the field of AI and Law. According to him, legal reasoning is a
form of theory construction (and not reconstruction) of any kind of pre-existing
entities (McCarty 1997, p. 221). This idea has been transformed into a precise,
computational model by Bench-Capon and Sartor (2003). Their highly complex
proposal cannot be presented here in detail. In short, legal reasoning, with particular
regard to legal reasoning in common law countries, can be seen as a process of
theory construction. Theories are then used to model argument moves, such as citing
cases and presenting counterexamples (Bench-Capon and Sartor 2003, pp. 115 ff.).
Theories may be evaluated against certain criteria, jointly referred to as coherence
criteria, such as explanatory power or consistency (pp. 113–114).
The line of AI and law research presented above is very vivid, yet, at least as
regards computational features, limited to modeling of legal argumentation in
common law systems rather than in jus civile systems. Due to its high level of
generality, Hage’s proposal encompasses legal argumentation in both types of
systems, but in order to develop a computational constructive model of legal
argumentation with statutes, a more detailed insight concerning constructivism of
legal argumentation as regards statutory law is needed. Interestingly, such
theoretical background may be found in the work of one of LWS scholars, legal
philosopher Sawa Frydman.
In his work entitled Legal Dogmatics in the Light of Sociology. Study 1: On
Interpretation of Statutes, published in Polish, Frydman (1936) intends to analyse
the phenomenon of statutory interpretation in scientific manner. The main object of
Frydman’s investigations is the so-called dogmatic legal interpretation, that is,
interpretation performed by legal scholars in abstraction, independently of concrete
legal cases.
Frydman avoids formulation of arbitrary definitions, in particular he tends not to
define the crucial term ‘interpretation’ at the outset of his analysis, but begins with
introduction of a technical and more tangible concept of ‘pattern of behaviour’ and
contends that patterns of behaviour may be formulated in different types of
expressions. The author makes use of careful conceptual distinctions and provides
clear criteria for these distinctions. One of the most important distinctions concerns
the aim of performing statutory interpretation:
1. interpretation aiming at recognizing and justifying of patterns of behaviour on
the basis of a statute (so-called objective interpretation)7;
7 Objective interpretation takes place, for instance, when an impartial legal scholar investigates to
construct a proper pattern of behaviour on the basis of the wording of the statute, legislative intent and
other relevant materials.
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2. interpretation aiming at justifying of patterns of behaviour recognized
independently of the statute, yet potentially ‘supported’ by the statute (so-
called apparently objective interpretation)8;
3. interpretation aiming at foreseeing the behaviour of individuals to whom the
statute will be a guideline for behaviour or who will attempt to ground their
behaviour in the statute (so-called anticipatory interpretation)9 (Frydman
1936, p. 160).
For the sake of brevity, here we will comment only on the conception of
objective interpretation. Frydman advocates the following sense of objectivity:
interpretation (of a statute) is objective if and only if it is true that from the
premises p, q, r it follows that: the statute S contains the pattern of behaviour Z
(Frydman 1936, p. 177).
He puts emphasis on the relation between the premises and conclusion of the
process of interpretation. As premises of interpretation are chosen on arbitrary basis,
hence, the sense of statutes is constructed rather than reconstructed (Frydman
1936, p. 178). In consequence, Frydman’s proposal is a very early and very well-
elaborated example of constructivist approach to legal reasoning. In the following
subsection we suggest reasons for adopting of Frydman’s ideas as a point of
departure for investigations concerning constructive model of legal reasoning with
statutes.
4.2 Frydman’s Conception of Constructive Interpretation as a Basis
for Extension of Contemporary Models of Legal Argumentation
Frydman’s constructive theory of interpretation is a very early antecedent of
contemporary theories of legal argumentation employing the notion of construction.
Due to its methodological rigour, Frydman’s proposal is very understandable also
for contemporary scholar. It offers a rich, technically sound and at the same time
realistic account of interpretation of statutes in civil law countries. Therefore, we
contend, it may be fruitfully used as a point of departure or a source of inspiration
for development of a formal model of statutory interpretation, accounted as a
constructive process. There are at least three advantages which justify such choice.
First, Frydman’s theory encompasses numerous useful distinctions (as the one
encompassing objective, apparently objective and anticipatory interpretation) and
thus enables a theorist to develop a nuanced model without excessive oversimpli-
fications and to take different nuances concerning statutory interpretation into
account. In certain works in the field of AI and law it is clearly stated what is the
aim of the argumentation modeled and what is the role of the subject who performs
acts of argumentation (Ashley 1990). However, Frydman’s contribution enables us
8 This kind of interpretation can be performed by an attorney, who attempts to show that some behaviour
of his client (chosen on the basis of extra-legal, for instance economic, considerations) is exactly what a
statute requires from its addressees.
9 If an attorney tries to foresee the interpretive decision of the court, he or she is involved in anticipatory
interpretation.
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to look at these topics from a very broad perspective, in particular by combining the
criterion of person performing act of interpretation (a professional counsel, a judge
or a legal scholar) with criterion of aim of interpretation (objective, apparently
objective and anticipatory interpretation) at the point of departure of development of
a given model. Hence, Frydman’s conceptual scheme provides authors of models of
argumentation with conceptual tools for precise characterization of a type of legal
argumentation they intend to model.
Second, due to its constructive character, Frydman’s theory stimulates focus on
justificatory argumentation in legal reasoning. Frydman’s constructivism seems also
to be realistic (in the sense of representing actual legal argumentative practice), for
we do not dispose of any ‘ultimate’ criterion that could be used to assess the
properness of legal argumentation.10
Finally, third, due to emphasis on the relation between premises and conclusion,
Frydman’s theory is a motivating factor to look at this relation in the specific
context of statutory interpretation. Frydman himself presumably employed a
traditional notion of logical entailment here however, his account of ‘logic’ in this
respect was not limited to deductive inference, but also to other types of intellectual
operations such as ‘comparison of generated results, delimiting the scopes,
elimination of contradictions, yielding consequences’ (Frydman 1936, p. 209).11
Formalization and operationalization of these notions can possibly lead to
interesting results as regards modeling of the process of argumentation concerning
the sense of statutes.
5 Conclusion
Since some of the ideas of the school are still remarkably vivid in the Polish
research community, they should not be treated as purely historical achievements.
Although the logico-methodological ideas of the LWS were designed for different
purposes, the flourishing of argumentation theory may be an inspiration for
exploring their new applications. Hence, three representative areas of inquiry
discussed in the paper (i.e. uncertain reasoning, fallacies and legal argumentation)
may become the point of departure for further study aimed at bridging the gap
between the LWS and contemporary study of argument.
Apart from discussed topics, the rich legacy of the LWS covers a number of other
ideas which are in line with current research strands in argumentation theory.
Hence, at least three more issues could be included into this inquiry: Twardowski’s
arguments against symbolomania and pragmatophobia, Ajdukiewicz’s model of
subjectively uncertain inference and Bochen´ski’s account of deontic authority. The
reason to discuss Twardowski’s criticism (Twardowski 1999) of ‘symbolomania’
10 Hage’s claims that reconstructivism theses are not falsifiable seems to support Frydman’s position very
strongly (see Hage 2013, p. 142).
11 The topic of the so-called legal inferences is a very interesting one. Many types of arguments actually
used in legal practice are non-deductive, but in many cases it is possible to treat them logically and to
reconstruct them as valid deductive patterns. Cf. Wolen´ski (2010a, pp. 83–84), discussing argumentum a
fortiori
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(the view which holds that symbolization in formal logic is an exclusive source of
language precision and clarity) is that it may be inspiring for seeking for detailed
connections between the pragmatic approach to language and reasoning in the LWS
and in argumentation theory. Ajdukiewicz’s probabilistic model of subjectively
uncertain inference (Ajdukiewicz 1974) in which we accept the conclusion with
lesser certainty than the premises may be studied in line with contemporary
achievements in building computational models of defeasible arguments. Finally,
Bochen´ski’s account of deontic authority (Bochen´ski 1974) may become a
foundation for an inquiry towards building argumentation schemes for appeals to
such authorities which are (socially, morally) authorized to tell people what they
should do.
Since the emerging Polish School of Argumentation is, amongst other tasks,
focused on bridging the gap between Polish research tradition and the study of
language, reasoning and argument in contemporary argumentation theory, the
proposed directions of future inquiry may constitute one of its important areas of
development. This should lead not only to contributions to contemporary
discussions on selected open problems in argumentation theory, but also to
popularization of the LWS heritage concerning pragmatic logic, fallacies and legal
reasoning.
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